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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFFORD J. LAWRENCE, l 
Plaintiff and Respondent, I 
vs. 
J. RAY WARD, LEWIS SELLE-l
1 
NEIT, dba United Auto Sales and 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY & 
GUARANTY COMPANY, Civil No. 8461 
Defendants and Respondents, ! 
JOHN W. HARDMAN, et al., 
Third Party Plaintiffs and 
1 
Respondents, 
SANDY CITY BANK, j 
Third Party Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY 
& GUARANTY COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent, United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Company agrees generally with the Statement of Facts 
contained in Appellant's Brief, but desires to add the 
following facts. 
For convenience the Respondent will hereafter be 
referred to as U.S.F. & G. Co. 
Following the cmnmencement of the original action 
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by Clifford J. Lawrence, this Respondent filed its Com-
plaint in Interpleader bringing into Court the Third 
Party Defendants. This Respondent's maximum poten-
tial liability on its bonds was $1,000.00 on the bond of 
Selleneit and $5,000.00 on the bond of Ward. It acknow-
ledged .a possible liability under the bonds and asked 
the Court to determine its liability to the Plaintiff and to 
each of the Third Party Defendants. (R. 16 to 18) 
The judgment of the Trial Court was in favor of 
the Plaintiff and Third Party Defendants against Ward 
and Selleneit for a total of $10,553.00. \Vith the excep-
tion of Third Party Defendants, Bellows, Lyon and 
Dalton, judgments w~re against both Ward and Sel-
leneit jointly and severally. The judgments for Bellows 
for $322.50, for Lyon for $1,070.00 and for Dalton for 
$107.00 were not against Selleneit. All judgments, ex-
cept Sandy City Bank for $5,849.01 were also against 
the U.S.F. & G. Co. (R.174 to 177). 
If the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed there 
is enough bond money to pay in full all the judgments 
against the U.S.F. & G. Co. These judgments were for 
$4,683.89 and the bonds totaled $6,000.00. 
After the trial and judgment of the Court and on 
October 31, 1955 the amount of the judgment against 
the U.S.F. & G. Co., the sun1 of $4,683.89, was by the 
U.S.F. & G. Co. deposited with the Clerk of the Court 
to satisfy said judgmen.t (R. 179). 
If Sandy City Bank is to share in the bond money 
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there will be total claims against the bonds of $10,553.00 
and the amount of the bonds, $6,000.00, will pay ap-
proximately 57% to each of the claimants. Therefore, 
if Sandy City Bank succeeds in its attempt on this Ap-
peal to share in the bond money, the amount of recovery 
for each of the other parties from the bond money will 
be reduced by 43%. The additional potential liability of 
the U.S.F. & G. Co. is $1,316.11. The potential loss to 
the Plaintiff and Third Party Defendants, except Sandy 
City Bank, is 43o/o of $4,683.89, or $2,014.27, unless the 
judgments against Ward and Selleneit can be collected. 
The pleadings in the case are voluminous (R. 1 to 
189). The transcript of the testimony of the witnesses 
covers pages 193 to 396 of the Record. A Pre-Trial 
was conducted and a Pre-Trial Order signed by the Trial 
Judge (R. 140 to 145). The claims of Sandy City Bank 
are set out in the Pre-Trial Order (R. 142 and 143). 
STATElVfENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE MORTGAGE OF THE CADILLAC TO SANDY 
CITY BANK BY WARD WAS NOT SUCH A TRANS-
ACTION AS TO BE PROTECTED BY THE USED 
MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER'S BOND OF WARD 
OR THE MOTOR VEHICLE SALESMAN'S BOND OF 
SELLENEIT FURNISHED BY THE U.S.F. & G. CO. 
POINT II 
THE USED MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER'S BOND AND 
MOTOR VEHICLE SALESMAN'S BOND DO NOT PRO-
TECT SANDY CITY BANK AGAINST LOSS BY 
REASON OF THE NON-ENDORSEMENT OF THE 
HARDY CHECK OR THE FORGERY OF THE DALTON 
CHECK, BOTH o:F' WHICH WERE ISSUED BY 
WINDER INSURANCE AGENCY. 
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' 
POINT III 
THE LOSS SUFFERRED BY SANDY CITY BANK WAS 
THE RESULT OF ITS OWN NEGLIGENCE SUCH AS 
TO BAR RECOVERY FROM U.S.F. & G. CO. 
ON THE BONDS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE MORTGAGE OF THE CADILLAC TO SANDY 
CITY BANK BY WARD WAS NOT SUCH A TRANS-
ACTION AS TO BE PROTECTED BY THE USED 
MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER'S BOND OF WARD 
OR THE MOTOR VEHICLE SALESMAN'S BOND OF 
SELLENEIT FURNISHED BY THE U.S.F. & G. CO. 
The argument under this Point is in answer to the 
argument of Appellant under Points I, II and ill of 
Appellant's Brief. 
The Cadillac in question was one owned by J. Ray 
'Vard, or as Appellant interprets the situation, one sold 
by United Auto Sales, which was in fact J. Ray Ward, 
to J. Ray Ward, the sale of which was financed through 
Winder Insurance Agency by loan and mortgage with 
Sandy City Bank. It w.as a new 1954 Inodel (Ex. 26-D, 
R. 296 and 7). ":--ard gave his note for $2,962.08 payable 
to the Rand~· City Bank at the rate of $1:23.4:2 per month 
(Ex. 25-D, R. 296 and 8). ~\ chattel1nortgage was given 
to SandY CitY Bank to secure the paJinent of the note 
.at tiH' rate of $123.4:2 per nwnth, which was executed by 
.J. H.ay 'rani (Ex. :.2()-D, R. :29G). ~-\..check for $2,500.00 
wa~ writtPn hy \Yinder Insurance Agency payable to 
.J. Hn~· \Yanl and United Auto Sales to pay the proceeds 
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obtained in exchange for the note and rnortgage (Ex. 
24-D, R. 296 and 8). 
This Respondent contends that this type of trans-
action is not covered by the bond. At most it was a sal':> 
bv a licensed and bonded used motor vehicle dealer to 
himself with the financing of this sale being made by the 
Sandy City Bank through Winder Insurance Agency. 
The motor vehicle was a new vehicle, not a used one. 
The transaction, as far as the bonded used motor vehicle 
dealer was concerned was one to obtain finances for the 
operation of his business. Unlike the other transactions 
J. Ray Ward, the purchaser, was not defrauded because 
of a sale of an automobile by United Auto Sales to him. 
A person cannot defraud himself. 
Respondent submits that a reasonable interpretation 
of the Used Motor Vehicle Act is that said Act was 
designed to protect those who purchase used cars from 
a used motor vehicle dealer. There is nothing in the Act 
which expressly gives protection to banks or other 
financial institutions who desire for a profit to finance 
the business of the used motor vehicle dealer. Banks and 
other financial institutions trained and experienced as 
they are in financial matters should not need the protec-
tion of the Act as do prospective buyers of vehicles. The 
bonds required are small in amount, $5,000.00 for dealers 
and $1,000.00 for salesrnen. To extend the protection of 
the bonds to include protection for those who finance 
the sale of automobiles, or who finance the operations 
of the business of a used motor vehicle dealer, is to re-
duce the protection afforded to those who suffer loss by 
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reason of being defrauded when they purchase used 
vehicles fron1 licensed and bonded used motor vehicle 
dealers and salesmen. 
Section 41-3-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, in re-
ferring to the bond to be filed by the dealer provided 
that the bond shall be: 
"conditioned that the said applicant shall con-
duct his business as a dealer without fraud or 
fraudulent representation and without the viola-
tion of any of the provisions of this act." 
What is meant by the words "conduct his business as 
a dealer~" The necessary part of business of a dealer 
is the purchase of used motor vehicles and the sale there-
of to the public. The borrowing of money to carry on 
the business or the financing of a sale of an automobile 
to the dealer himself is not, in the opinion of Respondent, 
conducting his business. These are incidental to the 
business, similar to the making and filing of reports and 
returns for the business and the payment of taxes on 
the business. Certainly the filing of a false return and 
underpayment of money on ·a Utah State Sales tax 
return, Federal tax return, or Withholding tax and Social 
Security tax are not covered by the bond. It .appears to 
Respondent that this transaction with the Sandy City 
Bank through the '\Yinder Insurance Agency is not one 
covered by the bond and that the Trial Court correctly 
found that this loan was not by J. Ra~T '\Yard made in 
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POINT II 
THE USED MOTOR VEHICLE DEALER'S BOND AND 
MOTOR VEHICLE SALESMAN'S BOND DO NOT PRO-
TECT SANDY CITY BANK AGAINST LOSS BY 
REASON OF THE NON-ENDORSEMENT OF THE 
HARDY CHECK OR THE FORGERY OF THE DALTON 
CHECK, BOTH OF WHICH WERE ISSUED BY 
WINDER INSURANCE AGENCY. 
The argument under this Point is in answer to 
Points IV, V, VI and VII of Appellant's Brief. 
The loss suffered by Sandy City Bank occurred only 
after that bank, upon which the checks were drawn 
against the account of Winder Insurance Agency, cashed 
the checks made payable in the one instance to Hardy 
and United Auto Sales and in the other instance to 
Dalton and United Auto Sales. The Hardy check had 
no endorsement as far as the payee Hardy was con-
cerned. The Dalton check bore an endorsement which 
Dalton contended was a forgery. The American Surety 
Company insured Sandy City Bank against loss by 
forgery and reimbursed Sandy City Bank for its loss on 
this check. 
The loss on these two checks .arose not out of the 
business of a sale of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles 
by the used motor vehicle dealer or his salesman, but 
because the bank cashed the checks without an endorse-
ment in the one instance and with a forged endorsement 
in the other instance. 
Respondent has been unable to find any case which 
has construed or interpreted Section 41-3-16, U.C.A., 
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1953 or similar acts of other states in regards to who are 
protected under the bond furnished by a motor vehicle 
dealer as required by such a statute. 
A case decided by the Supreme Court of Idaho in 
1933 interpreted the Idaho statute requiring a farm 
produce broker to furnish a bond and this case might be 
of some assistance in arriving at a decision in this case. 
The case is that of Lebrecht v. Union Indemnity Com-
pany, 53 Idaho 228, 22 P. 2d 1066. 
The Sections of the Idaho Statutes considered and 
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Idaho were: 
"Section 22-1005. 'No person shall act as 
farm produce broker, farm produce dealer, or 
farm produce commission merchant within the 
meaning of this act without first having obtained 
a license and given a bond as hereinafter de-
scribed. Such license shall expire on June 1st of 
each year and must be renewed yearly.' 
Section 22-1006. 'Any person desiring to act 
as a farm produce broker, f.arm produce dealer, 
or farm produce commission merchant within the 
meaning of this act in the state of Idaho, shall 
make written application for a license therefor 
to the commissioner of agriculture, stating the 
name and residence of the applicant, his prin-
cipal office or place of business in this state, name 
of the person or persons in charge of his office 
or business in this state, the names and addresses 
of five persons residents of this state, of whom 
inquiry can be made as to the character, standing 
.and reputation of the applicant; if the applicant 
is a corporation, the nan1es and addresses of its 
officers and directors; if a co-partnership, the 
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names and addresses of the partners. All applica-
tions for licenses hereunder shall be filed with 
the commissioner of agriculture and shall be .ac-
companied by a good and sufficient bond in the 
penal sum of not less than $2500 and upon a form 
to be approved by the attorney-general of the 
state of Idaho, and shall be executed by the ap-
plicant as principal and by a surety company 
authorized to do business in the state of Idaho 
as surety. Said bond shall be for the benefit of 
any and all consignors having any cause of action 
against the broker, dealer or commission Iner-
chant, giving such bond and .arising out of a 
breach of contract either expressed or implied 
of such broker, dealer or commission merchant 
with a consignor or with consignors as broker, 
dealer, commission merchant and consignor or 
consignors or for any fraud practiced by such 
broker, dealer or commission merchant for the 
violation of the rights of any consignor or con-
signors, and shall be conditioned for the faithful 
perforinance by the applicant of all duties as 
such broker, dealer or commission merchant, and 
shall be for the full period of the time covered 
by such license. * * * ' 
Section 22-1008. 'The bond herein required 
to be given shall be conditioned that said ap-
plicant will conduct and transact his business 
honestly and without fr.aud of any kind or nature 
and will comply with the provisions of this act 
and all the laws of the state of Idaho. Any per-
son injured by dishonesty, fraud or violation of 
the provisions of this act or of the laws of the 
state of Idaho, committed by any person licensed 
under the provisions of this act and while engaged 
in such business shall have a right of action on 
such bond for his damages not exceeding the 
amount of the bond." 
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Lebrecht purchased potatoes from the licensed 
broker and paid therefor, but the potatoes were not 
delivered nor was the amount p.aid for them returned to 
the purchaser. 
The Idaho Court construed the statutes and held 
that the purchaser was a consignee and that the statutes 
were for the protection only of the consignor as defined 
in the act. 
The Court said: 
"A consignor, as defined, parts with his pro-
duce in large quantities, by selling and delivering 
the same to the broker, dealer, or merchant with-
out getting his pay for the same, who, in turn 
disposes of the produce and invariably receives 
his money. Without the security furnished under 
the act, the consignor would have to rely entirely 
upon the fin~:ncial standing, honesty, and in-
tegrity of the broker, dealer, or merchant, that he 
will be honestly dealt with. Sharp practices and 
financial instability were often times found to 
exist, causing the consignor to suffer loss, which, 
undoubtedly, prompted the passage of the act. 
Other people deal with the broker on an alto-
gether different basis and are in a much better 
position to protect themselves. These are reasons 
why protection should he, and is, afforded to the 
consignor, and not to others. This being a statu-
tory bond, its terms will be construed under the 
statute to afford protection to the consignor only. 
In construing a statute, it is the duty of the court 
to consider the reason for the law, its object, and 
purpo~r. so as to ascertain and render effective 
the legislative Intent." 
10 
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It appears to Respondent that the purpose of the 
Utah statute is to protect purchasers of used cars from 
the dealers and not to protect banks and finance com-
panies who are in better position to protect themselves. 
POINT III 
THE LOSS SUFFERRED BY SANDY CITY BANK WAS 
THE RESULT OF ITS OWN NEGLIGENCE SUCH AS 
TO BAR RECOVERY FROM U.S.F. & G. CO. 
ON THE BONDS. 
This Point applies to all three transactions in which 
Sandy City Bank suffered losses. 
On the Ward Cadillac transaction no proof of owner-
ship or indicia of title was required before a loan of 
$2,500.00 was made thereon. Reliance was placed only 
on the fact that dealings were had with a licensed dealer 
(R. 302 and 313). 
Mr. Fotheringham of Winder Insurance Agency 
acted as agent for the bank in handling the transaction. 
He took mortgages and notes and delivered checks with-
out requiring any title certificates to be delivered because 
he knew none were available (R. 302). If title certificates 
were not available checks for loans could have been held 
by Sandy City Bank or Winder Insurance Agency until 
title certificates were obtained and after the title cer-
tificates had been delivered the checks could then have 
been delivered had the bank desired to protect itself. 
At the time the Dalton check (Ex. 12-D) was pre-
sented to Sandy City Bank for payment, the bank had 
11 
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in its possession a chattel mortgage and a promissory 
note, both of which had been signed by Mr. Dalton (R. 
12). No comparison of the purported signature of Dalton 
on the check was made with his known signature on the 
chattel mortgage and promissory note (R.13). The check 
was cashed without taking any steps to secure the title 
certificate to the car involved. 
The Hardy check (Ex. 21-D) was cashed without the 
endorsement of Hardy (R. 310). If the bank had used 
the simple precaution of requiring the endorsement of 
a payee before cashing this check it would have suffered 
no loss. This check was also cashed without taking any 
steps to secure the title certificate to the car involved. 
The essential elements for recovery for fraud are: 
"The essential elements required to sustain 
an action for deceit are, generally speaking, that 
a representation was 1nade as a statement of fact, 
which was untrue and known to be untrue by the 
party making it, or else recklessly made; that 
it was made with intent to deceive and for the 
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon 
it; and that he did in fact rely on it and was in-
duced thereby to act to his injury or damage." 
23 Am. J ur. 773. 
In considering whether or not there has been a 
reliance by the person \Yho rlaims to have been defraud-
ed, one 1nust consider the duty on the part of the per-
son to whom the representation has been made to use 
some 1neasures of protection and precaution to safe-
12 
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guard his interest, as appears from the following state-
ment: 
"The authorities are well agreed that the 
principle of right of reliance is closely bound up 
with a duty on the part of a representee to use 
some measure of protection and precaution to 
safeguard his interest. It is well settled, as a 
broad generalization, that a person to whom false 
representations have been made is not entitled 
to-relief because of them if he might readily have 
.ascertained the truth by ordinary care and at-
tention, and his failure to do so was the result of 
his own negligence. Although the authorities are 
in accord on the abstract proposition that there 
is no right of reliance if the conduct of the re-
presentee constitutes negligence in the premises, 
under the circu1nstances of the case, the nature 
of the transaction and representations, and the 
situation of the parties, the authorities are not 
in perfect accord as to the standard by which the 
conduct of the representee is to be judged. Ac-
cording to some courts, the test is objective. It 
has frequently been stated that in order that false 
representations be a ground for an action of 
deceit, or for recission of a contract entered into 
in reliance thereon, they must be such as are 
calculated to impose upon or deceive a person of 
ordinary prudence, and of such a character that 
a reasonably prudent person would rely on them. 
According to other courts, the standard for mea-
suring the conduct of the representee is subjec-
tive, based not on what the ordinary man would 
do under the circumstances, but on what the 
particular representee should have done. Under 
this view, the test for determining whether one 
party to a transaction has a right to rely on 
representations of the other is not whether a 
reasonable man would be justified in relying on 
13 
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such representations, but whether they were of 
such a nature and made in such circumstances 
that the complaining party had a right to rely 
thereon. A rule which has been approved, and 
which combines those elements of both the ob-
jective and subjective tests which have been stated 
by the courts enunciating them to be desirable, 
is that in measuring the right to rely upon rep-
resentations, every person must use reasonable 
diligence for his own protection. Under any 
standard of conduct, and in the absence of ac-
companying actual deception, artifice, or mis-
conduct, it is well agreed that where the means of 
knowledge are at hand and are equally available 
to both parties, and the subject matter is equally 
open to their inspection, if one of them does not 
avail himself of those means and opportunities, he 
will not be heard to say that he was deceived by 
the other's misrepresentations. The reasons and 
justification for this rule have been variously 
stated, as that it is public policy; that it is an 
offshoot of the rule of caveat emptor; that in the 
circumstances envisaged by the rule, any con-
sequential loss is attributable to the representee's 
carelessness and neglect of his own interest rather 
than to the false representations, and that, there-
fore, the maxin1 ''volenti non fit injuria" is applic-
able." 23 Am. Jur. 960, 
The action and conduct of the Sandy City Bank in 
its dealings with Ward and Selleneit were, in the opinion 
of Respondent, very negligent and careless and were not 
the actions and conduct of a careful bank. Under these 
circumstances Respondent sub1nits that Sandy City Bank 
should not be entitled to recover against Respondent 
14 
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because of the loss occasioned by its own carelessness 
and negligence. 
The judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROTH, GRA WFORD & NELSON and 
ELLIOTT W. EVANS 
By 
ELLIOTT W. EVANS 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
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